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VAUGHN C. BALL*
Is a park better than a courthouse; a road than a school, or an
airfield than a waterworks? Legislators, judges and administrators
are frequently faced with the problem of deciding how these ques-
tions shall be shaped for answer, and who shall answer them.
Almost without exception, production and services require land-
area for their accomplishment; they are forms of land use. The
number and range of our governmental and other public activities
have increased and accelerated. The quantity of land devoted, and
needs for land to be devoted, to what are legally termed "public
uses" have multiplied; there are and will be more and larger high-
ways, reservoirs, airports, customshouses, power plants, cemeteries
and sewers. The total of suitably located and modified land has
scarcely kept pace. It can do so only through efficient employment
of the area available. The threat of maladjustment in uses shows
itself in conflicts among our myriad of governments, government
agencies and public service corporations; in efforts by more than
one such body to acquire and use the same real property for one
public purpose to the partial or total exclusion of others.
CONDEMNATION ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM
We are here concerned with an analysis of the power of a fed-
eral, state or local government, its agency, or a public utility, to
take or authorize the taking for public use of land held for the
same or a different public use by another such government, agency
or utility. The attempt to effect the shift in land use may be made
by legislation, either general or ad hoc, administratively, or by a
combination of means. In the typical situation one (the taker) or
both of the public bodies involved may possess to some extent a
form of power to administer property in the public interest-the
power of eminent domain. Among other ways, therefore, the inter-
agency conflict may come before the courts in the guise of a lawsuit
to exercise this power, i.e., in condemnation proceedings. The
general question of compensation for the condemnation or transfer
is beyond the scope of the present inquiry; it is assumed that com-
pensation is forthcoming when required by law. It is also assumed
that if the land were privately owned and devoted to private use
no impediment to the taking would exist.
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A technicality prevents the problem from arising in condemna-
tion as often as would otherwise happen, although it does not pre-
vent other forms of litigation. Land acquired for federal agencies
is taken and held in the name of the United States of America., An
effort by one federal agency to condemn land used by another would
present the impossibility of a suit by the United States against
itself. Questions of necessary shifts in land use are presently re-
solved directly by Congress or administratively by the President,
2
the Public Buildings Administration,3 the Federal Real Estate
Board, 4 or the agencies involved. A very considerable number of
state agencies take and hold title in the name of the state, and
condemnations between them are likewise impossible,5 the matter
of shifts in use being often handled by direct action of the state
legislature2 This means a special act every time a change of use
is to be made. Administrative machinery for handling the less im-
portant but often numerous decisions is frequently either lacking
or meager. 7 Many state agencies and many local governmental
units are, however, considered sufficiently separate entities to hold
at least legal title in their own names, and are therefore in a posi-
tion to attempt to condemn property from one another. Likewise,
different governments or their agencies may contend for the same
land. In this process the problem of choosing among competing
public uses is posed for the condemnation court.
As a preliminary, the legal analysis customarily employed in
dealing with the simple condemnation of private property may be
outlined. Subject to constitutional limitations, the state and federal
' See, e.g., 56 STAT. 174 (1942), 15 U.S.C. § 606b (1946) (Reconstruction
Finance Corporation); 46 STAT. 60 (1933), 16 U.S.C. § 831c (1946) (Tennes-
see Valley Authority).
U. S. CONST. ART. IV, § 3. For examples of Congressional and Presidential
shifts of property use, see 60 STAT. 765, 42 U.S.C. § 1809 (1946) ; 55 STAT. 838
(1941), 50 U.S.C. APP. § 601 (1946); United States v. Chum Chin, 150 F. 2d
1016 (C.C.A. 9th 1945).
" In the Federal Works Administration. Reorg. Plan I, § 303, 53 STAT. 561
(1939), 5 U.S.C. § 133 (1946). The Deputy Commissioner for Real Estate
Management assigns space in federal buildings throughout the country.
' Created by Exec. Order No. 8034, 3 CODE FED. REGS. 443 (Cum. Supp.
1943).
'People v. Sanitary Dist., 210 Ill. 171, 71 N.E. 334 (1904).
"As in Monaghan v. Armatage, 218 Minn. 108, 15 N.W. 2d 241 (1944),
cuppeal dismissed, 323 U.S. 681 (1944).
One effort to supply this need is VA. CODE ANN. § 3832 (1942): "No
corporation shall take by condemnation proceedings any property belonging to
any other corporation possessing the power of eminent domain unless after
hearing all parties in interest, the State Corporation Commission shall certify
that a public necessity or an essential public convenience shall so require and
shall give its permission thereto; and in no event shall one corporation take by
condemnation proceedings, any property owned by and essential to the pur-
pose of another corporation possessing the power of eminent domain."
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governments have the power to extinguish private property rights.
The extinguishment of such rights as the result of the appropri-
ation for public use of the land with respect to which they exist
creates a privilege in the taker to prevent the future exercise of the
rights by the persons bound by the condemnation proceedings, and
is an exertion of the power of eminent domain.8 The legislature
may itself determine the need for shifting land from private to
public use, and select the exact location, quantity and quality of
interest to be taken. Or the legislature may by statute delegate a
power of eminent domain to its agency or to a private corporation
or individual, including the power to determine the necessity of
taking particular private property. Selection of the specific land
to be taken seems to be a legislative determination, whoever makes
it, but the courts are not completely agreed on the extent to which
it is subject to judicial review." Despite variations in expression,
most of the cases can be reconciled with a single position: if the
intended use is public, a decision by the legislature or its agency
or the grantee of a general grant of the power of eminent domain,
as to the necessity of taking specific land is reviewable, if at all, only
for bad faith, arbitrary action or abuse of discretion.10
Frequently, instead of being privately owned and used, the land
is already devoted to public use.". Then the dilemma which concerns
us here arises. The condemnor decides that it needs such land for
its public purposes, but the holder decides that its own needs require
it to resist the taking. The court in which the condemnation pro-
ceeding is brought seems to be required, whether it "reviews" any-
thing or not, to affirm one decision (thus reversing the other), or
to import and enforce some compromise.
By far the greater number of cases has arisen out of a state
context. The conflicts are among states and such local units as
I This phraseology follows that of the RESTATEMENT, PROPERTY § 507, com-
menta (1944).
1 On the question of what is meant by review, see Davis, Nonreviewable
Administrative Action, 96 U. OF PA. L. REv. 749 (1948).
10 City of Eugene v. Johnson, 192 P. 2d 251 (Ore. 1948); May v. City of
Kearney, 145 Neb. 475, 17 N.W. 2d 448 (1945) ; Dallas v. Malloy, 214 S.W. 2d
154 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); Porter v. Board of Sup'rs of Monona County, 238
Iowa 1399, 28 N.W. 2d 841 (1947); In re Joe's Downtown, 80 N.Y.S. 2d 41
(Sup. Ct. 1947); State ex rel. St. Paul & Tacoma Lbr. Co. v. Dawson, 25 Wash.
2d 499, 171 P. 2d 189 (1946). Even in some states which call the determina-
tion of necessity judicial the same test is used. Johnson v. Consolidated Gas,
Elect. Light & Power Co., 50 A. 2d 918 (Md. 1947). A state constitution may
place the determination elsewhere. Cleveland v. Detroit, 322 Mich. 172, 33 N.W.
2d 747 (1948) (jury).
n In this connection "devoted" does not mean dedication without use, or
mere permission; there must be a legal obligation to maintain the public use.
Bailey v. Anderson, 182 Va. 70, 27 S.E. 2d 914 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
799 (1944).
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counties, townships, cities, towns and villages; as well as among
school districts, levee districts and other ad hoc or special-function
units. Since under our system the power of eminent domain is
dormant in the absence of some form of legislation,12 problems
arising from its exercise are almost always treated by the courts
as matters of constitutional and statutory interpretation. Over a
long series of interplaying enactments and decisions a variety of
theories for the resolution of this inter-agency conflict have evolved.
Actually, they overlap; the following artificial segregation is made
for purposes of description.
THE STATE METHOD: JUDICIAL SUBSTANTIVE ADJUSTMENT
The power of a state legislature to authorize the shifting of
land in public use to another public use is not disputed, and the
problem is ascertainment of the legislature's intent. When this is
clearly manifested, the legislature has spelled out the answer as
between the contenders. But if the state's general delegation of the
power of eminent domain is made, as it usually is, to scores or
hundreds of public and private corporations, 13 the courts are forced
to formulate rules of construction-bluntly, to construct a result
which is to represent what the legislature would have decided if the
precise question as to possible conflict in land uses had been put
to it. The literal application of each grant of the power of eminent
domain would affirm the decision to take in every case, allowing
condemnor A to take from B, B to retake from A, and so on. The
unsuccessful party would be the one first exhausted by the expense
of litigation, and this construction has been rejected.1 4 At the
opposite extreme is the construction that property once devoted
to public use can under no circumstances be shifted to a different
public use under a general delegation of eminent domain. Every
change would then depend upon a special statute, and this view
has likewise been rejected. 1"
Instead, where the uses are inconsistent a legislative intent not
to authorize the shift is presumed. The rule most frequently de-
clared is that property already devoted to public use may not be
"Oklahoma City v. Local Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 134 P. 2d 565
(Okla. 1945).
E.g., ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 71 (1940): "Corporation formed for the
purpose of constructing, operating or maintaining railroads, street railroads,
gas or electric works, water companies, power companies, canals, terminals,
bridges, viaducts, wharves, piers, telegraph or telephone lines, or any other
work of internal improvement or public utility, may exercise the power of
eminent domain in the manner provided by law." There are broader provi-
sions in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1001 (1941) and CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. ANN. § 1238
(Supp. 1948).
"Ridgewood v. Glen Rock, 15 N.J.Misc. 65, 188 Atl. 698 (Sup. Ct. 1936).
Central Bridge Corp. v. Lowell, 4 Gray 474, 482 (Mass. 1855).
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condemned for an inconsistent public use unless authorized ex-
pressly or by necessary implication.16 Whether the authority is
necessarily implied in a general statutory authorization depends
upon the circumstances of the individual condemnation.' Where no
such implication arises, this general rule disallows the shift on the
basis that priority in time gives priority in right.
Other decisions take a different tack. The existing and proposed
uses are evaluated, and if the proposed use is found to be "higher"
or "superior" or "more necessary" than the existing use, the taking
will be permitted under general authorization. 8 This rule of
adjustment may involve either evaluation of the uses in general or
as they appear in the particular situation. What seems to be a
similar doctrine, although it has the longer history, is the distinc-
tion between governmental and proprietary uses. Land owned by
a government, but held for so-called proprietary uses is often de-
clared subject to taking under general authority, even by a non-
government body, while land in governmental use may not be
taken.19 This rule has been employed as the basis for adjustment
between two states; one state's railroad property within another
state is subject to the latter's power of eminent domain.2 0
A special problem is presented by the attempt of one private
corporation to take for public use land already devoted by a second
private corporation to the identical use. Where this would mean
a shift in ownership only and not at all a shift in use, the taking
is denied. The implication is that taking from A and giving to B
is not due process of law and is beyond even the legislature's power
if A and B are private corporations. -1 What seems actually to be
meant is that although the use is and continues to be a public one,
in such circumstances the talking can have no public purpose.
Where the shift is from private to public ownership, or there is
an appreciable change in the manner of use, the rule has no
"Yadkin County v. City of High Point, 217 N.C. 462, 8 S.E. 2d 470 (1940);
Board of Com'rs for Clarendon County v. Holliday, 182 S.C. 510, 189 S.E. 885
(1937); Ridgewood v. Glen Rock, supra note 14; City of Norton v. Lowden, 84
F. 2d 663 (C.C.A. 10th 1936); Masonic Cemetery Ass'n v. Gamage, 38 F. 2d
95 (C.C.A. 9th 1930); Portland Ry. Light & Power Co. v. Portland, 181 Fed.
632 (C.C. Ore. 1910).
"Vermont Hydro-Electric Corp. v. Dunn, 95 Vt. 114, 112 Atl. 223 (1921).
"State ex rel. Northwestern Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 28 Wash. 2d
476, 183 P. 2d 802 (1947) ; Denver v. Board of Com'rs of Arapahoe County, 113
Colo. 150, 156 P. 2d 101 (1945) ; see Fry v. Jackson, 264 S.W. 613, 618 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1924).
"State v. Superior Court, 91 Wash. 454, 157 Pac. 1097 (1916).
Georgia v. Chattanooga, 264 U.S. 472 (1924) ; see Florida State Hospital
for the Insane v. Durham Iron Co., 194 Ga. 350, 354, 21 S.E. 2d 216, 219 (1942).
'West R. Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 507 (U.S. 1848); Charles R. Bridge
v. Warren Bridge, 11 Pet. 420 (U.S. 1837).
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application.2 2
It has been assumed to this point that the decision of the holder
of land to resist condemnation was sound to the extent that the
existing and proposed uses were inconsistent; that the continuation
of one prevented the introduction of the other. Contrary to the
tendency under some of the other rules against review of the merits
of the parties' determinations, the factual question of inconsistency
of use seems to be held open to full judicial review in any case.
If the court finds the uses consistent, taking will be allowed under
general authority to the extent necessary to accommodate both uses.
The test of consistency is said to be that there be no material inter-
ference with the existing use.2- The capacity of these doctrines to
pinch-hit for the legislative will in individual cases has not always
been satisfactory. Logically they are inconsistent with the rule
applied when privately used property is condemned, that selection
of the specific land is a legislative function delegated to and lying
in the discretion of the condemnor. Confronted with conflicting
claims of public interest in a situation in which refusal to decide
would itself be a substantive resolution, the courts seem to have
accepted full judicial review and a considered substantive adjust-
ment as the only way to promote justice. The essentially legislative
character of the determination of necessity has occasionally caused
legislatures to attempt further spelling-out of their desires, in the
form of substantive rules similar to those already discussed. Some-
times the trend is reversed, and the court is expressly directed to
make substantive adjustments. When this is done by state con-
stitutional provisions the only question that can be raised is whether
it represents wise political policy. When it is done by statute there
is the further question whether it does not violate the separation
of powers.2 4
" Long Island Water Supply Co. v. Brooklyn, 166 U.S. 685 (1897); State
'. rel. Washington Water Power Co. v. Superior Court, 8 Wash. 2d 122, 111
P. 2d 577 (1941).
'Freeman Gulch Mining Co. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 119 F. 2d 16
(C.C.A. 10th 1941); Clark v. Boysen, 39 F. 2d 800, 816 (C.C.A. 10th 1930),
ccrt. denied, 282 U.S. 869 (1931); Greenup County v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry.,
71 F.Supp. 652 (E. D. Ky. 1947); Cocanougher v. Zeigler, 112 M1ont. 76, 112
P. 2d 1059 (1941).
" On this general problem, compare, with the view that the determination
of necessity is legislative, Coecanougher v. Zeigler, supra note 23; Cleveland
v. Detroit, 322 Mich. 172, 33 N.W. 2d 747 (1948) ; Village of Bangor v. Hussa
Canning & Pickle Co., 208 Wis. 191, 242 N.W. 565 (1932); Peavey-Wilson
Lumber Co. v. Brevard County, 31 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 1947). As to the separation
of powers, sce Barmel v. Minneapolis-St. Paul Sanitary Dist., 201 Minn. 622,
277 N.W. 208 (1938); Searle v. Yensen, 118 Neb. 835, 226 N.W. 464 (1929).
Statutes requiring that the proposed use be "more necessary" could be con-
strued as a guide to the discretion of the condemnor. Matthaei v. Housing
Authority, 177 Md. 506, 9 A. 2d 835 (1939).
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The difficulty is caused by this running-together of the two
questions posed in the opening paragraph of this article, and
always posed when one agency contends with another for the same
land. The more inclusive and appealing query is: what substantive
adjustment of this particular conflict represents the best pattern
of use of the land involved?
JUDICIAL DETERMINATION OF MAXIMUM PUBLIC BENEFIT
In theory, this question may be answered by a return to the
original basis of the doctrine of eminent domain. The power finds
its justification in the necessity of appropriating the property of
some one person for the benefit of the entire community. From this
standpoint there is nowhere any disagreement upon the test by
which the relative value of all substantive adjustments is to be
measured. Through all claims, theories, statutes and decisions
runs the ideal: that pattern of land use is best which produces the
maximum public benefit. In every case in which the court weighs
the desirability of any substantive adjustment, the following pro-
cess is applied to some extent, whether articulated or not. The
existing use, taken alone, is assigned a value in terms of public
benefit. The proposed use alone is likewise assigned a value in
terms of public benefit. In assigning these values, some account is
taken of the reasonable potentialities of each use if allowed to be
developed unhindered. Next, the effect of introduction of the pro-
posed on the existing use is considered. It may have no effect, it
it may increase the value of the existing use, or it may decrease it.
When it is said that the existing use would be "destroyed" it is
sometimes meant that it would have to be relocated, and the pos-
sibility of relocation and the value of the use as relocated should
then be considered. A value in terms of public benefit is thus
assigned to the existing use as affected by the proposed use. The
same process is carried out on the proposed use, and a value is
assigned which represents the public benefit derived from the
proposed use as affected by continuation of the existing use. The
values of the two affected uses are totalled.
There are now available for comparison three quantities, repre-
senting existing .use, proposed use and total of affected uses. A
comparison of the values is made. If the value of the existing use
is equal to or greater than either of the other figures the shift
should be completely denied since it would result in no increase in
public benefit. If the total of the affected uses is the highest the
taking will be allowed to the extent necessary for the land to ac-
commodate both uses. If the proposed use has the highest value of
the three the taking should be allowed in full, even if the result is
to destroy or cause relocation of the existing use.
(Vol. 10
INTERGO VERNMENTAL CONFLICTS
The legal theories of adjustment already discussed now appear
as factors in making the determination described. Each is proper
for controlling the substantive adjustment in one kind of case, but
not for application without regard to all the others. The doctrine of
consistent uses represents the sound substantive solution when the
total of affected uses is the highest of three assigned values. The
doctrine of higher use states the result when the proposed use has
the highest value. The rule against "taking from A and giving to
B" is merely one of the instances in which the existing use has a
value at least equal to any of the others, so that the shift should
be completely denied; and its inapplicability, for example when
private ownership is to be exchanged for public ownership, is based
upon a resulting rise in valuation of the proposed use in terms of
public benefit. The rule of priority in time should be applied sub-
stantively only when existing use is at least equal to either of the
other values, although it seems more frequently to represent a
refusal to attempt evaluation. But refusal to evaluate merely
amounts to assuming that all three values are equal.
Any of the doctrines is "wrong" from a substantive point of
view if applied in all cases, because this would include the inevitable
instances in which the single value enthroned by one particular
doctrine is not the highest of the three. The synthesis suggested
must be taken as a theoretical solution only. In application, the
difficulty is one of assigning values-a difficulty which will be
referred to hereafter.
THE FEDERAL HIERARCHY: JURISDICTIONALLY
INTEGRATED ADJUSTMENT
Inter-agency conflicts in land acquisition involving the United
States have presented a somewhat different context from that
already considered. The federal relationship among governments
has suggested and there has gradually developed, a different method
of adjustment of such conflicts. It is based, not on review and
substantive formulation, but on a principle of delineation of the
respective authorities of the contending agents.
This method considers the federal and the state and local gov-
ernments as forming a hierarchy. In its constitutional field the
federal government leads the list by virtue of the supremacy clause
of the Constitution.2-  The United States may authorize its agents
to take land for purposes within the sphere of federal control, and
neither a state nor a local government can prevent, condition or
interfere with the taking. Nor does it matter what previous public
use the subordinate government was making of the land. In United
States v. Carinwck,2 the Federal Works Administrator and the
:'U. S. CONST. ART. IV.
329 US. 230 (1946).
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Postmaster General jointly selected, 27 as site for a federal post
office and customshouse, land held by a city in trust for and used
as a park, courthouse, city hall and public library. The United
States brought condemnation proceedings. The city did not object
to the taking, but the heir of the grantor in trust claimed that the
trust and the prior governmental and public use of the property
rendered it immune from condemnation. It was held that the fed-
eral agents had discretion to select the site despite conflicting local
governmental uses; and that their decision was not reviewable
unless possibly for bad faith, or arbitrary or capricious action,
which was not shown. The power of eminent domain of the federal
government exercised within its sphere was held to be supreme.
The same theory has been followed in other cases..281
The doctrine that the decision of a superior government or its
agency to take particular land should control over the resistance of
a subordinate government user seems to lead directly to a rule for
resolution of conflicts in the converse situation. If a government
lower in the hierarchy should attempt to take land held by a su-
perior, the latter's decision that the shift should not be made must
control. When the agency of the superior government possesses the
power of condemnation any other result seems impossible, since it
could immediately retake.
As early as 1849, the Supreme Court had held that a city could
not open'streets through a federal reservation devoted to military
7Under 25 STAT. 357 (1888), 36 STAT. 1167 (1911), 40 U.S.C. § 257 (1946);
44 STAT. 630 (1926), 40 U.S.C. § 341 (1946).
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941);
United States ex rel. TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546 (1946); Kohl v. United
States, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); United States v. Montana, 134 F. 2d 194 (C.C.A.
9th 1943), cert denied sub. nom. Montana v. United States, 319 U.S. 772
(1943); Minnesota v. United States, 125 F. 2d 636 (C.C.A. 8th 1942); C. M.
Patten Co. v. United States, 61 F. 2d 970 (C.C.A. 9th 1932), rev'd on other
grounds, 289 U.S. 705 (1933); United States v. 385 Acres of Land, 61 F. Supp.
239 (E. D. Wis. 1945); United States v. .8677 Acre of Land, 42 F. Supp.
91 (E. D. S.C. 1941); United States v. 2.74 Acres of Land, 32 F. Supp. 55
(E. D. Ill. 1940). Cases dealing more specifically with the extent of the review
are United States v. New York, 160 F. 2d 479 (C.C.A. 2d 1947), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 832 (1947) ; United States v. Merchants Transfer & Storage Co., 144
F. 2d 324 (C.C.A. 9th 1944); United States v. Meyer, 113 F. 2d 387 (C.C.A.
7th 1940), cert. denied sub. nom. Meyer v. United States, 311 U.S. 706 (1940);
United States v. 40.75 Acres of Land, 76 F. Supp. 239 (N.D. Ill. 1947). The only
square holding that there is no judicial review whatever of the condemnor's
determination, in line with the legislative theory, is a case which refuses to
admit evidence offered to show bad faith. United States v. 243.22 Acres of
Land, 129 F. 2d 678 (C.C.A. 2d 1942). Some of the decisions may have
turned upon the question whether Congress, in passing statutes allowing the
condemnor to take the land upon a declaration and deposit prior to the deter-
mination of compensation, intended to separate the taking from other features
of the proceedings. See United States v. Catlin, 324 U.S. 229 (1945).
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purposes.'" One factor served to obscure the application of the rule.
At some periods the United States makes no active use of particu-
lar land owned by it. An early decision, not discerning any inter-
ference with federal governmental activity, attempted to split the
capacity of the United States into "governmental" and "proprie-
tary" categories, and to allow subjection of such federal land to the
state's power of eminent domain on the theory of proprietary hold-
ing.", The distinction seems gradually to be waning in other fields,'
and its application to the federal government in this situation is
unsound for a number of reasons. It is decidedly contrary to the
conception of the federal government as one of limited delegated
powers. Every acquisition, holding or disposition of property by
the United States depends upon proper exercise of a constitutional
grant of power and is thus governmental.3 1 The federal decision
against allowing taking by an inferior government must therefore
control under the supremacy principle.
This conclusion is even more strongly required by Article IV,
Section 3, of the United States Constitution, which expressly grants
to Congress the power to dispose of and make all needful rules and
regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to
the United States.' This carries full power to protect such lands,
to control their use and to prescribe in what manner others may
acquire rights in them.23 In Utah Power and Light Company v.
United States,3 the utility located its reservoir and other equipment
on vacant land of the United States open for settlement and sale
and not then appropriated or used for any governmental activity.
The United States sued to enjoin continued occupation by the util-
ity, which resisted on the ground of consent under federal statutes
and also claimed that the state's grant of eminent domain to it en-
abled it to appropriate idle land of the United States. The decision
was that consent was lacking, and that the public lands of the
United States were held not as by a proprietor, but in trust for all
the people25 By this decision the proprietary category seems to be
' United States v. Chicago, 7 How. 185 (U.S. 1849).
' United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., Fed. Cas. No. 16,114 (C.C.N.D.
Il1. 1855); see United States v. Chicago, supra note 29, at 194. But see Van
Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 161 (1886).
"' United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
cCf. An.T. I, § 8, granting exclusive legislative jurisdiction over all places
purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall
be for the location of forts, magazines, arsenals, dock yards and other needful
buildings.
-United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 33 (1947) ; United States v. San
Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940).
243 U.S. 389 (1917).
'Accord: Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 230 Fed. 328 (C.C.A.
8th 1915), modified on another point, 242 Fed. 292 (C.C.A. 8th 1917). The court
19491
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eliminated, and federal land is subject to condemnation by a sub-
ordinate government or its agency only with the consent of Con-
gress. Subsequent cases hare taken this view. 6
Overtones from the older theories of substantive adjustment are
found woven into the hierarchy theory; only in the recent series of
decisions involving the state and federal governments has the
hierarchy taken the definite jurisdictional shape described here.
The former overlapping and confusing employment within the
hierarchy theory of the governmental-proprietary distinction has
been noted. The doctrine of consistency of uses has been used in at
least one case to produce a result possibly contrary to the hierarchy
theory.3 7 The constitutional distribution of powers has also been
occasionally obscured by casting it in terms of the rule of higher
use, carrying along the implication of full judicial review and the
possibility that the subordinate government, if the court finds its
use equal or higher, may oust the superior government from its con-
stitutional field.3 8 The recent decisions indicate that these confu-
sions will be eliminated in the future, and the method of jurisdic-
tionally integrated adjustment will completely replace all theories
of judicial substantive adjustment in federal-state conflicts.
LEGISLATIVE DETERMINATION OF MAXIMUM PUBLIC BENEFIT
The cases already noted have involved federal officials or fed-
eral corporate agencies exercising delegated discretion to determine
what pattern of land use would produce the maximum public bene-
fit in the particular situation. A wider ambit for the hierarchy
theory has resulted from the growth of federal regulation of public
service corporations under the commerce power. It seems plain
that the grantee of a power of eminent domain from the federal
government, even if a private corporation or individual, is to that
extent the agent of the federal government; particularly in the light
of the more recent recognition that every federal purpose is gov-
ernmental and not proprietary as regards condemnation problems.
In Missouri ex rel. Camden County v. Union Electric Light and
Power Company,39 the defendant was licensed under the Federal
said, 230 Fed. at 336, that the lands were held "... in trust for all the people
of all the states to pay debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare . . . [T]hey are held for these supreme public uses when and as they
arise."
" Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939); Town of Okemah v.
United States, 140 F. 2d 963 (C.C.A. 10th 1944) ; of. Griffin v. United States,
168 F. 2d 457 (C.C.A. 8th 1948).
" United States v. Southern Power Co., 31 F. 2d 852 (C.C.A. 4th 1929).
"United States v. Jotham Bixby Co., 55 F. 2d 317 (S.D. Cal. 1932),
aff'd sub. nom. C. M. Patten Co. v. United States, 61 F. 2d 970 (C.C.A. 9th
1932), rev'd on other grounds, 289 U.S. 705 (1933) ; United States v. Carmack,
151 F. 2d 881 (C.C.A. 8th 1945), rev'd, 329 U.S. 230 (1946).
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Water Power Act-0 to construct a dam across a navigable river,
which would flood land occupied by a county courthouse and jail,
as well as sections of public highways and land included in school
districts. The project was to improve navigation, but defendant was
authorized to use for industrial purposes the hydro-electric power
created. The power of eminent domain was expressly delegated to
such licensees. The state and county sued to enjoin the construction
of the dam. It was held that the defendant had power to acquire
by eminent domain the lands already devoted to a public purpose
within the state.
The number of such grants of condemnation power is small.41
Most public service corporations receive their powers of eminent
domain from the state government. There is, however, another
factor to be considered. At present many public utilities engage in
operations within the federal sphere, and are subject to regulation
by such federal administrative agencies as the Federal Power Com-
mission, Interstate Commerce Commission, Federal Communica-
tions Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, and the like.42 Within
statutory limits, approval of one of these agencies is necessary be-
fore the utility can extend or abandon lines, routes or operations,
or construct, alter or dismantle facilities. The approval takes the
form of certifying, after consideration, that the public interest will
be served thereby. When the extension, abandonment or other
activity involves acquisition and use of new land, or the giving up
of land previously used, as it very frequently does, this means vir-
tual agency control of the utility's decision on land acquisition or
shift in land use. In some situations the agency can order the
change on application of interested parties other than the utility, or
on its own initiative. This regulatory power eliminates conflicts
in land use between utilities in the single field regulated. Since all
the agencies are of the same government, there is the possibility
of executive resolution of conflicts between utilities not subject to
the same commission. It would seem that agency approval renders
-42 F. 2d 692 (W. D. Mo. 1930), appeal dismissed, 52 F. 2d 1080 (CC.A.
8th 1931).
1141 STAT. 1077 (1920), 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-823 (1926), now the Federal
Power Act.
11 One is contained in the Natural Gas Act, 52 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 717-717w (1946); 61 STAT. 459 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (Supp. 1948).
- 41 STAT. 1077 (1920) as amended, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791-825 (1946); 52 STAT.
821, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1946); 61 STAT. 821 (1938), 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-
717w (1946); 61 STAT. 459 (1947), 15 U.S.C. § 717f (Supp. 1948) (Federal
Power Commission); 24 STAT. 379 (1887) as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1-400,
901-1100 (1946) (Interstate Comnmerce Commission); 52 STAT. 977 (1938) as
amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 401-682 (1946) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 48 STAT.
1064-1105 (1934) as amended, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1946) (Federal Commu-
nications Commission).
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the utility's decision to take specific land by condemnation or to
resist the taking, an agency decision and therefore a legislative and
governmental decision.
The cases which treat the matter show that the commissions in
considering which decisions best serve the public convenience and
necessity are authorized to be responsive to other factors as well
as to interstate commerce and the problems of the particular utility
field. 43 In First Iowa Hydro-Electric Cooperative v. Federal Power
Commission,44 plaintiff applied to the Federal Power Commission
for a license to construct a power project on a navigable river in
Iowa. The Federal Power Act required applicants to submit to the
commission satisfactory evidence of compliance with the laws of
the state within which the project is to be located. The laws of Iowa
required a permit from the State Executive Council to use water
from state streams for industrial purposes, upon statutory condi-
tions which' were incompatible with the project. The Commission
dismissed plaintiff's application for failure to submit evidence of
compliance with the state law. The Supreme Court held that the
Iowa statute could not give the state veto power over the federal
project, and that the relative importance of the national and state
interests was to be weighed by the Commission: "It is the Federal
Power Commission rather than the Iowa Executive Council that
must pass upon these issues on behalf of the people of Iowa as well
as on behalf of all others. '45
In view of all this, the following extension of the hierarchy
theory is conceivable for the future. If the condemnor's decision
that its proposed use of specific land is more necessary than the
holder's, or vice versa, is approved or ordered by a regulatory
agency having jurisdiction so to approve or order upon a consid-
eration of the public benefit including factors relevant in both fields
of use, the decision becomes an agency decision. It takes its rank
under the hierarchy theory with the federal government, for which
the agency acts. Whether the regulated corporation gets its power
of eminent domain from the state or the federal government seems
immaterial. Indeed, when the decision is to resist condemnation,
the fact that the holder has not the power of eminent domain should
make no difference. The decision of any agency would be subject
to the amount of judicial review normally provided for its agency
decisions. The purpose and effect of the extension would be to bring
to the deciding task in the first instance such equipment as the
'Purcell v. United States, -315 U.S. 381 (1942); Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 315 U.S. 373 (1942) ; Colorado
v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926).
"328 U.S. 156 (1946).
5 Id. at 182.
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agency can furnish in staff, experience, and expertness in special-
ized fields of land use.
This possibility is not without its problems. Its mechanical sim-
plicity may have the result, in hard cases, of arrogating to the
agency decision an effect which might be beyond the probable inten-
tion of the legislature.- ' It may be difficult to determine whether
the agency decision is actually a finding that in the public interest
one pattern of use of particular land is more valuable than another,
with all relevant factors considered, as distinct from mere approval
or ordering of (for example) an extension or abandonment of
routes or lines, without full consideration of the conflict of land uses
involved if the decision is carried out in a particular way.4 ' Fur-
ther, when the national government is not involved, and state and
local levels are reached, the outlines of the hierarchy necessary to
the jurisdictional method are indefinite. This is due to the present
changing condition of state-local relations. Counties, townships,
municipalities, and special-purpose districts form a stratification
many layers deep over the same land area. Their relative authori-
ties are uncertain because the distribution of state and local powers
among them is uncertain.4 Adjustment of land use conflicts by
state planning agencies is probably impossible because of their
present elementary stage of development, even if complete centrali-
zation in such bodies of adjustment of public use of lands be found
acceptable.--- The general re-ordering of these complex relations
and the substitution of state adminstrative supervision for the
awkward process of detailed legislative regulation of them is
frequently urged.:" To the reasons for such reform may be added
the needs of the present problem.
This does not prevent all application of the jurisdictional theory
in the state field. Mere elimination of the term "proprietary" solves
Cf. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring in Carmack v. United States, 329 U.S.
230,248 (1946).
- The powers of the regulatory commissions vary from statute to statute.
For a discussion of the factors considered by the ICC in control of construction
and abandonment, sce CHERINGTON, THE REGULATION OF RAILROAD ABANDON-
MENTS (1948); Marshal, Railroad Certificates of Convenience and Necessity
l. sved ioider the Inteestate Commerce Act, 22 ORE. L. REv. 215, 331 (1943).
" Council of State Governments, Report of the Committee on State-Local
Relations (1946), contains description and analysis.
- On the status of such agencies, see COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE
BOOK OF THE STATES 269-273 (1948-1949). Statewide zoning agencies are non-
existent, and the power of local zoning commissions over land in public use is
in doubt. State ex rel. Helsel v. Board of Com'rs of Cuyahoga County, 19 N.E.
2d 698 (Ohio C.P. 1947), aff'd 78 N.E. 2d 694 (Ohio App. 1948), appeal dis-
issed, 79 N.E. 2d 911 (Ohio 1948); Taber v. Benton Harbor, 280 Mich. 522,
274 N.W. 324 (1937).
'Council of State Governments, Report of the Committee on State-Local
Relatios (1946) passi.
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the conflict of state and state on an integrated basis, without change
in result. The extraterritorial landholding powers of one state,
although governmental, must be subordinate to the powers of the
state in which the land lies.51 Some resolution of problems within
the individual state has already emerged. If the condemnor is a
state agency, for example, a highway commission, which takes and
holds title in the name of the state and uses it for general state pur-
poses, courts now treat its exercise of eminent domain as being that
of the sovereign itself.52 Such an agency's selection of specific land
despite conflicting use by a local body is authoritative. The rule has
been applied to refuse condemnation of even "idle" state-held land
in the converse situation.5 3 These are steps in the direction of inte-
grated adjustment, avoiding judicial substantive formulations.
Tracing the lines of authority between state and local agencies
is possible in other situations. In addition to highways, airports,
and other public works, the general state interest in such fields as
utility regulation, conservation, and education is increasingly rec-
ognized. To the extent that an administrative body with state-wide
jurisdiction has been delegated the authority to perform a general
state (as distinct from local) function, the agency-decision princi-
ple suggested under the federal method may be applicable. State
public service commissions exercise in the intra-state field a practi-
cal control, similar to that of federal agencies, over decisions on
land acquisitions and relinquishment by public service corporations.
Such agency decisions should be treated as legislative determina-
tions by the state, in case of conflict.
On the above descriptions, some comparison of the two diverse
methods of adjustment of inter-agency conflicts in land use is
possible.
COMPARISON AND CONCLUSION
On its own level of abstraction, as an ideal to be sought, although
not attainable with concrete precision in a given case, the method
of judicial substantive adjustment seems unobjectionable. In prac-
tice it throws all the stress of the conflict upon the evaluation of
land uses in terms of public benefit and raises the second question
suggested at the beginning of this article. Who shall make the
A case treating the effort of one state to condemn land in another is
Wayne County Court v. Louisa & Ft. Gay Bridge Co., 46 F. Supp. 1 (S.D.
W.Va. 1942).
1 State Highway Commission v. City of Elizabeth, 140 AtI. 335 (N.J. Ch.
1928), aff'd sub. nom. City of Elizabeth v. State Highway Commission, 103 N.J.
Eq. 376, 143 Atl. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1928) ; Town of Winchester v. Cox, 129
Conn. 106, 26 A. 2d 592 (1942).
rIni re Cruger Ave., 238 N.Y. 84, 143 N.E. 799 (1924); Steelhammer v.
Clackamas County, 170 Ore. 505, 135 P. 2d 292 (1943) semble.
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series of decisions that one pattern of land use is preferable, all
things considered, to another?
It is better to draw a few clear lines of authority than to expose
each case to the toils of litigation. From the standpoint of physical
efficiency in land use, the evaluation of public interest is a matter
of engineering. From the standpoint of social goals involving
eminent domain for their implementation, it is a matter of political
policy. Administering the growing and incessant procession of such
evaluations requires steady attention to both statecraft and tech-
nology; day-to-day balancing of aims, needs and facilities; continu-
ous forethought on possibilities, developments and demands.
The sound basic position of the courts is shown in the rule they
apply to condemnations of property in private use. The devotion of
property to public needs is a legislative problem, to be determined
by the legislature and its agents. Applications of the formula of
substantive adjustment for maximum public benefit, balancing un-
der rules of consistency, of higher use, are for such agents. In the
normal case, when landowner and legislative agent disagree, the
latter has the authority of the community behind him. This is the
foundation of eminent domain. When legislative agents disagree,
the question for the judiciary is still, not whose proposal seems
more desirable, but who has authority in the matter at hand. Courts
have made substantive adjustments only because the boundaries of
the respective authorities are not clear, and the common principal
(the legislature) is not and cannot be accessible for continuous
consultation as to authority. The method of jurisdictionally inte-
grated adjustment furnishes the more satisfactory solution of
the problem.
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